The Export Control Bill, which is presently before Parliament (the Hansard report starts here), has serious implications for academic freedom. One of its goals is to extend export controls on armaments from physical goods to intangibles such as software. However, the powers are so widely drawn that they give ministers the power to review and suppress any scientific papers prior to publication. They also give ministers the power to license foreign students - not just at British universities, but students taught by British nationals anywhere in the world.
Section 2, on `transfer controls', says that `The Secretary of State may by order make provision for ... the imposition of transfer controls in relation to technology of any description. For this purpose `transfer controls', in relation to any technology, means the prohibition or regulation of its transfer:-
*by a person or from a place within the United Kingdom to a person or place outside the United Kingdom;
*by a person or from a place outside the United Kingdom to a person or place outside the United Kingdom (but only where the transfer is by, or within the control of, a United Kingdom person);
*by a person or from a place within the United Kingdom to a person or place within the United Kingdom (but only where there is reason to believe that the technology may be used outside the United Kingdom); or
*by a person or from a place outside the United Kingdom to a person or place within the United Kingdom (but only where the transfer is by, or within the control of, a United Kingdom person and there is reason to believe that the technology may be used outside the United Kingdom).
The penalty is up to ten years' jail, and ministers are also allowed by section 6 to `amend, repeal or revoke, or apply (with or without modification) provisions of any Act or subordinate legislation.' Even by the standards of the `Henry VIII' powers seen in some recent Acts, this is extreme.
The first draft of the proposals surfaced in 1998 in a white paper, following the arms-to-Iraq scandal. Until then, Britain's arms export control laws covered only physical equipment; by comparison, US law enabled the authorities to ban electronic exports too. This meant in practice that researchers in Britain (and most other countries) could distribute software containing cryptographic routines freely, while our US counterparts could not. The US government lobbied for other countries to fall in line, and the Export Bill is the result. (Following opposition to the initial white paper from the Trade and Industry Select Committee, it was promoted by a roundabout route - by first promoting it as a European agreement, then excusing the bill as a European obligation.) Curiously, this is happening just as the USA is abandoning many controls on intangible exports, after some high profile prosecutions of activists ran into trouble. So it looks like the positions will now be reversed: Americans will be able to export software more or less freely while Britons will labour under a licensing regime.
But that's not all. The UK proposals are very much more severe than anything experienced in America, and they affect much more than just cryptography. The list of technologies whose export `electronically' would become subject to licensing is set out by international treaty (though the DTI could add extra items if it wished). The relevant treaty, known as the Wassenaar Arrangement, covers most of the subjects of interest to scientific and technological researchers, whether directly or through the tools we use.
For example, two of my research students use a focussed ion beam workstation to modify semiconductor chips. This machine is export controlled. What that means today is that the University has to get approval to buy one, and again several years later when we dispose of it. In future, we may need individual licences for my students to use it (one of them is Russian, the other Korean). They may also need to get a licence whenever they share a program they have written for the machine with another foreign national, or anyone overseas. As one of them is employed on an EU contract with French, Danish and Belgian collaborators, there could be even more forms to fill.
The proposed law would have effects right across science, technology and medicine. For example, teaching medicine to a foreign national would appear to require a licence; many of the core curriculum subjects, such as bacteriology, virology, toxicology, biochemistry and pharmacology are central to a chemical and biological weapons programme (indeed South Africa's programme was set up and run by PW Botha's personal physician). Other problematic subjects include not just nuclear physics and chemistry but also aerodynamics, flight control systems, navigation systems, and even computational fluid dynamics.
The new law would cover most of our research in computer science (fast networks, high performance computing, neural networks, real-time expert systems, hardware and software verification, reverse engineering, computer security, cryptography) and could even force a rewrite of lecture course and project material. The Department of Engineering would be hit by the listing of numerically controlled machine tools and fibre winding equipment, robots, optical amplifiers, software radios and aero engine control systems, as well as many lasers, gyros, accelerometers and similar components. The restrictions that previously only applied to physical hardware objects will be extended to the software used to design, test, control or operate them, or to integrate them into larger systems.
There could be a severe impact on collaborative research across national boundaries, including the EU funded research which now accounts for a large proportion of our science base. Such collaboration necessarily involves many intangible exchanges of technology. In the late 1990s, for example, I worked with scientists in Norway and Israel to develop a candidate encryption algorithm which was a finalist in the Advanced Encryption Standard competition, run by the US government. This involved sending over 400 emails back and forth, many containing fragments of source code. The DTI has confirmed to me that in future such exchanges will require a licence.
As three-quarters of Cambridge's research students in science and technology are foreign nationals, licensing will have a significant impact on the research base. The added delays and uncertainty involved in export licence applications will add to the pressures on departments; and it remains to be seen whether the licences would be sufficiently broadly phrased to support current ways of working, in which researchers move at will from one topic to another, and form ad hoc collaborations to tackle particular problems.
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/exportbill.html